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Abstract—Most of the traditional access control models, like
mandatory, discretionary and role based access control make
authorization decisions based on the identity, or the role of the
requester, who must be known to the resource owner. Thus,
they may be suitable for centralized systems but not for de-
centralized environments, where the requester and service
provider or resource owner are often unknown to each other.
To overcome the shortcomings of traditional access control
models, trust management models have been presented. The
topic of this paper is three different semantics (set-theoretic,
operational, and logic- programming) of RT T , language from
the family of role-based trust management languages (RT).
RT is used for representing security policies and credentials
in decentralized, distributed access control systems. A creden-
tial provides information about the privileges of users and the
security policies issued by one or more trusted authorities.
The set-theoretic semantics maps roles to a set of sets of en-
tity names. Members of such a set must cooperate in order
to satisfy the role. In the case of logic-programming seman-
tics, the credentials are translated into a logic program. In the
operational semantics the credentials can be established using
a simple set of inference rules. It turns out to be fundamental
mainly in large- scale distributed systems, where users have
only partial view of their execution context. The core part
of this paper is the introduction of time validity constraints
to show how that can make RT T language more realistic. The
new language, named RT T+ takes time validity constraints into
account. The semantics for RT T+ language will also be shown.
Inference system will be introduced not just for specific mo-
ment but also for time intervals. It will evaluate maximal time
validity, when it is possible to derive the credential from the
set of available credentials. The soundness and completeness
of the inference systems with the time validity constraints with
respect to the set-theoretic semantics of RT T+ will be proven.
Keywords—access control, inference system with time con-
straints, logic-programming semantics, role-based trust manage-
ment, set-theoretic semantics.
1. Introduction
Guaranteeing that conﬁdential data and services oﬀered by
a computer system are not made available to unauthorized
users is an increasingly signiﬁcant and challenging issue,
which must be solved by reliable software technologies
that are used for building high-integrity applications. The
data, whether in electronic, paper or other form must be
properly protected. The traditional solution to this problem
are access control techniques, by which users are identi-
ﬁed, and granted or denied access to a system, data and
other resources, depending on their individual or group
identity. This approach ﬁts well into closed, centralized
environments, in which the identity of users is known in
advance.
Role-based access control (RBAC) model [1], [2] is the
most ﬂexible type of access control policy. It uses a user
role to control of which users have access to particular re-
sources. Access rights are grouped by the role name and
access to resources is restricted to the users who are as-
signed to appropriate roles. This type of access control
works well in a large-scale centralized system and is often
used in enterprise environments. Quite the new challenges
arise in decentralized and open systems, where the iden-
tity of users is not known in advance and the set of users
can change. For example, consider a bookstore, in which
students who are returning customers are eligible to get dis-
count. However, when a person comes to the bookstore and
she says that she is Mary Smith, then her identity itself will
not help in deciding whether she is eligible for a discount
or not. What can help in this particular situation are two
credentials stating that she is a student (she has a student
card) and that she owns a bookstore card. The identity
of a user itself does not help in making decisions about
their rights. What is needed to make such decisions is in-
formation about the privileges assigned to the user by other
authorities, as well as trust information about the authority
itself.
The term of trust management was introduced in 1996 by
Blaze et al. in [3], who deﬁned it as a uniﬁed approach
to specify and interpret security policies, credentials and
trust relationships. In trust management system an entity’s
privilege is based on its attributes instead of its identities.
An entity’s attributes are demonstrated through digitally
signed credentials issued by multiple principals. A cre-
dential is an attestation of qualiﬁcation, competence or au-
thority issued to an individual by a third party. Examples
of credentials in real life include identiﬁcation documents,
driver’s licenses, membership cards, keys, etc. A credential
in a computer system can be a digitally signed document.
Such a concept of trust management has evolved since that
time to a much broader context of assessing the reliability
and developing trustworthiness for other systems and indi-
viduals [4]. In this paper, however, we will use the term
trust management only in a meaning restricted to the ﬁeld
of access control.
The potential and ﬂexibility of trust management approach
stems from the possibility of delegation: a principal may
transfer limited authority over a resource to other principals.
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Such a delegation is implemented by means of an appro-
priate credential. This way, a set of credentials deﬁnes the
access control strategy and allows deciding on who is au-
thorized to access a resource, and who is not. RT languages
combine trust management and RBAC features. To deﬁne
a trust management system, a language is needed for de-
scribing entities (principals and requesters), credentials and
roles, which the entities play in the system. Responding to
this need, a family of role-based trust management lan-
guages has been introduced in [5]–[7]. The family consists
of ﬁve languages: RT0, RT1, RT2, RT T , and RT D, with
increasing expressive power and complexity.
The core language of RT family is RT0, described in detail
in [7]. It allows describing localized authorities for roles,
role hierarchies, delegation of authority over roles and role
intersections. All the subsequent languages add new fea-
tures to RT0.
RT1 introduces parameterized roles, which can represent
relationships between entities.
RT2 adds to RT1 logical objects, which can be used to rep-
resent permissions given to entities with respect to a group
of logically related objects (resources). Those extensions
can help in keeping the notation concise, but do not in-
crease the expressive power of the language, because each
combination of parameters in RT1 and each permission to
a real instance of a logical object in RT2 can be deﬁned
alternatively as a separate role in RT0.
This paper focuses on RT T languages, as it provides use-
ful capabilities not found in any other languages: manifold
roles to achieve both agreement of multiple principals from
one set and from disjoint sets and role-product operators,
which can express threshold and separation of duties poli-
cies. Similar to a role, which deﬁnes a set of principals,
a manifold role deﬁnes a set of principal sets, each of which
is a set of principals which cooperation satisﬁes the man-
ifold role. A singleton role can be treated as a special
case of a manifold role, which set of cooperating entities
is a singleton set. This way, RT0 credentials can also be
expressed in RT T language.
A threshold policy requires a speciﬁed minimum number
of entities to agree on some fact, i.e., it requires agreement
among k out of a set of entities that satisfy a speciﬁed con-
dition, e.g., in a requirement that two diﬀerent bank cashiers
must authorize a transaction. Separation of duties policy
requires a set of entities, each of which fulﬁlls a speciﬁc
role, to agree before access is granted. Both types of poli-
cies mean that some transactions cannot be completed by
a single entity, because no single entity has all the access
rights required to complete the transaction, that is why it
is not possible to deﬁne it in RT0.
RT D provides mechanisms to describe delegation of role
activations and selective use of role membership. This lan-
guage is not covered in this paper.
A more detailed treatment of RT family can be found in [6].
The languages have a precise syntax and semantics deﬁni-
tion. A set-theoretic semantics, which deﬁnes the meaning
of a set of credentials as a function from the set of roles
into the power set of entities, has been deﬁned for RT0 [8],
[7] and we deﬁned relational semantics, which apply also
to other members of the family up to RT T in [9].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of the
role-based trust management language syntax and descrip-
tion of three semantics (relational, operational and logic-
programming), including example. Section 3 describes time
validity in RT T language. Section 4 shows inference sys-
tem over new RT T+ language time constraints. An overview
of the work related to RT systems and languages is given
in Section 5. Final remarks are given in Conclusions.
2. The Syntax and Three Semantics
of RT T Language
Basic elements of RT languages are entities, role names,
roles and credentials. Entities represent principals that can
deﬁne roles and issue credentials, and requesters that can
make requests to access resources. An entity can, e.g., be
a person or program identiﬁed by a user account in a com-
puter system or a public key. Role names represent per-
missions that can be issued by entities to other entities or
groups of entities. Roles represent sets of entities that have
particular permissions granted according to the access con-
trol policy. A role is described as a pair composed of an en-
tity and a role name. Credentials deﬁne roles by appointing
a new member of the role or by delegating authority to the
members of other roles.
2.1. The Syntax of RT T Language
In this paper, we use capital letters or nouns beginning
with a capital letter (e.g., A,B) to denote entities and sets
of entities. Role names are denoted as identiﬁers beginning
with a small letter or just small letters (e.g., r,s). Roles
take the form of an entity (the issuer of this role) followed
by a role name separated by a dot (e.g., A.r). Credentials
are statements in the language. A credential consists
of a role, left arrow symbol and a valid role expression.
There are six types of credentials in RT T , which are
interpreted in the following way:
A.r ← B – simple membership: entity B is a mem-
ber of role A.r.
A.r ← B.s – simple inclusion: role A.r includes (all
members of) role B.s. This is a del-
egation of authority over r from A to
B, because B may cause new entities
to become members of the role A.r by
issuing credentials that deﬁne B.s.
A.r ← B.s.t – linking inclusion: role A.r includes
role C.t for each C, which is a mem-
ber of role B.s. This is a delegation
of authority from A to all the members
of the role B.s. The expression B.s.t is
called a linked role.
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A.r ← B.s∩C.t – intersection inclusion: role A.r in-
cludes all the entieties who are mem-
bers of both roles B.s and C.t. This is
a partial delegation from A to B and C.
The expression B.s∩C.t is called an in-
tersection role.
A.r ← B.s⊙C.t – role A.r can be satisﬁed by a union
set of one member of role B.s and one
member of role C.t. A set consisting
of a single entity satisfying the inter-
section role B.s∩C.t is also valid.
A.r ← B.s⊗C.t – role A.r includes one member of role
B.s and one member of role C.t, but
those members of roles have to be dif-
ferent entities.
The models discussed in this paper can be, in general, very
complex. Therefore, we present here only a simpliﬁed ex-
ample, with the intention to illustrate the basic notions and
the notation, with a focus on RT T credentials.
Example 1 (Example of RT T ). Suppose that we need at
least two out of four students to activate the subject. Using
RT0 credentials, we have to explicitly list all the students
(four in this simple case) and choose two of them; this
list needs to be changed each time members in the students
role change. In RT T only one credential is needed. Further,
we want to have two students and one Ph.D. student, who
can also (but does not have to) be a regular student. This
requires just one more RT T credential. The entire policy
can be expressed as follows:
F.students← F.student⊗F.student , (1)
F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students . (2)
Now, assume that the following credentials have been
added:
F.student ←{Alex} , (3)
F.student ← {Betty} , (4)
F.student ←{David} , (5)
F.student ←{John} , (6)
F.phdStudent ← {John} , (7)
F.phdStudent ←{Emily} . (8)
Then one can conclude that, according to the policy, any
pair of students from the set {Alex,Betty,David,John} is
suﬃcient to fulﬁll the role F.students, but to activate the
subject it is required that either the pair includes John, or
additionally Emily must also attend.
2.2. The Set-Theoretic Semantics of RT T Language
The semantics of RT0 has no potential to describe the mean-
ing of RT T , which supports manifold roles. Therefore, we
deﬁne the meaning of a set of credentials as a relation over
the set of roles and the power set of entities. Thus, we use
a cartesian product of the set of roles and the power set
of entities as the semantics domain of a RT language. The
semantics mapping would associate a speciﬁc relation be-
tween roles and entities with each set of credentials. Such
a relational approach allowed us to deﬁne a formal seman-
tics of RT T language presented in [9].
Example 2 (Set-theoretic semantics for Example 1). Com-
puting consecutive relations Si starts from an empty set,
S0 = φ . According to Deﬁnition 2 from [9] only creden-
tials 3 through 8 are mapped in S0 into relation S1:
S1 = {({F},student,{John}),({F},student,{Alex}),
({F},student,{Betty}),({F},student,{David}),
({F}, phdStudent,{John}),
({F}, phdStudent,{Emily})}.
Credential 1 adds the following instances to relation S2:
S2 = S1∪{
({F},students,{John,Alex}),
({F},students,{John,Betty}),
({F},students,{John,David}),
({F},students,{Alex,Betty}),
({F},students,{Alex,David}),
({F},students,{Betty,David}) }.
Credential 2 is resolved in S3:
S3 = S2∪{
({F},activeSub ject,{John,Alex}),
({F},activeSub ject,{John,Betty}),
({F},activeSub ject,{John,David}),
({F},activeSub ject,{John,Alex,Betty}),
({F},activeSub ject,{John,Alex,David}),
({F},activeSub ject,{John,Betty,David}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,John,Alex}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,John,Betty}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,John,David}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,Alex,Betty}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,Alex,David}),
({F},activeSub ject,{Emily,Betty,David}) }.
The resulting relation S3 cannot be changed using the given
set of credentials, hence: SP = S3. Because the RT lan-
guage considered in this example is RT T , there is a set
of sets of entities assigned to each role.
2.3. The Logic-Programming Semantics of RT T
The second way that shows how the member sets of roles
can also be calculated is to use a logic-programming seman-
tics. The logic-programming semantics of RT0 credentials
was ﬁrst introduced in [6]. A deﬁnition quoted in this sub-
section is a modiﬁed version of this semantics, which has
been introduced in [8]. In this case the semantics is given
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indirectly. RT credentials are translated into a logic pro-
gram and their semantics is obtained as the minimal Her-
brand model of the translation. The main intention of this
approach is to provide an implementation of credential res-
olution.
Definition 1: The logic-programming semantics of P is
the minimal Herbrand model of LP(P), the logic program
deﬁned as
LP(P) =
⋃
c∈P lc(c) ,
where function lc(·) translates every credential to a logic
program clause as follows:
lc(A.r ← B), r(A,B) :−
lc(A.r ← B.s), r(A,ξ ) : −s(B,ξ )
lc(A.r ← B.s.t), r(A,ξ ) :−s(B,ζ ),t(ζ ,ξ )
lc(A.r ← B.s∩C.t), r(A,ξ ) :−s(B,ξ ),t(C,ξ )
We decided to put some changes into logic-programming
semantics for RT0 and deﬁne the logic-programming se-
mantics of RT T .
lc(A.r ← B) = member(B,role(A,r))
lc(A.r ← B.s) = member(X ,role(A,r)) :−
member(X ,role(B,s))
lc(A.r ← B.s.t) = member(X ,role(A,r)) :−
member(C,role(B,s)),
member(X ,role(C,t))
lc(A.r ← B.s∩C.t) = member(X ,role(A,r)) :−
member(X ,role(B,s)),
member(X ,role(C,t))
lc(A.r ← B.s⊙C.t) = member(X ∪Y,role(A,r)) : −
member(X ,role(B,s)),
member(Y,role(C,t))
lc(A.r ← B.s⊗C.t) = member(X ∪Y,role(A,r)) : −
member(X ,role(B,s)),
member(Y,role(C,t)),X\= Y
where role(A,r) correspond to A.r, and
member(B,role(A,r)) correspond to A.r ← B.
As in the case of the set-theoretic, we use Example 1 from
Section 2 to illustrate the deﬁnition of RT semantics.
Example 3 (Logic-programming semantics for Exam-
ple 1).
lc(F.students←F.student⊗F.student) =
member(X ∪Y,role(F,students)) : −
member(X ,role(F,student)),
member(Y,role(F,student)),X\=Y
lc(F.activeSub ject←F.phdStudent⊙F.students) =
member(X∪Y,role(F,activeSub ject)) :−
member(X ,role(F, phdStudent)),
member(Y,role(F,students))
lc(F.student ← Alex) = member(Alex,role(F,student))
lc(F.student ← Betty) = member(Betty,role(F,student))
lc(F.student ← David) = member(David,role(F,student))
lc(F.student ← John) = member(John,role(F,student))
lc(F.phdStudent ← John) = member(John,role(F, phdStudent))
lc(F.phdStudent ← Emily)= member(Emily,role(F, phdStudent))
The above rules can be easily implemented by using some
prologue interpreter. Only minor syntactic changes (capital
letters, etc.) are necessary.
2.4. Inference System over RT T Credentials
RT T credentials are used to deﬁne roles and roles are used
to represent permissions. The semantics of a given set P
of RT T credentials deﬁnes for each role A.r the set of en-
tities, which are members of this role. The member sets
of roles can also be calculated in a more convenient way
by using an inference system, which deﬁnes an operational
semantics of RT T language. An inference system consists
of an initial set of formulae that are considered to be true,
and a set of inference rules that can be used to derive new
formulae from the known ones.
Let P be a given set of RT T credentials. The application
of inference rules of the inference system will create new
credentials, derived from credentials of the set P . A de-
rived credential c will be denoted using a formula P ≻ c,
which should be read: credential c can be derived from
a set of credentials P .
Definition 2: The initial set of formulae of an inference
system over a set P of RT T credentials are all the formulae:
c∈P for each credential c in P . The inference rules of the
system are the following:
c ∈P
P ≻ c
, (W1)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s P ≻ B.s ← X
P ≻ A.r ← X , (W2)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s.t P ≻ B.s←C
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r ← X
, (W3)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s∩C.t P ≻ B.s← X
P ≻C.t ← X
P ≻ A.r ← X
, (W4)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s⊙C.t P ≻ B.s ← X
P ≻C.t ← Y
P ≻ A.r ← X ∪Y
, (W5)
P ≻ A.r ← B.s⊗C.t P ≻ B.s ← X
P ≻C.t ← Y X ∩Y = φ
P ≻ A.r ← X ∪Y
. (W6)
There could be a number of inference systems deﬁned over
a given language. To be useful for practical purposes an in-
ference system must exhibit two properties. First, it should
be sound, which means that the inference rules could derive
only formulae that are valid with respect to the semantics
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of the language. Second, it should be complete, which
means that each formula, which is valid according to the
semantics, should be derivable in the system.
All the credentials, which can be derived in the system,
either belong to set P , rule (W1) or are of the type: P ≻
A.r ← X , rules (W2 through W6). To prove the soundness
of the inference system, one must prove that for each new
formula P ≻ A.r ← X , the triple (A,r,X) belongs to the
semantics SP of the set P . To prove the completeness
of the inference system over a set P of RT T credentials,
we must prove that a formula P≻ A.r ← X can be derived
by using inference rules for each element (A,r,X) ∈ SP .
Both properties have been shown in [10], proving that the
inference system provides an alternative way of presenting
the semantics of RT T .
Example 4 (Inference system for Example 1). We use the
inference system to formally derive a set of entities which
can cooperatively activate a subject. To make long example
shorter, let us use less credentials ((1), (2), (4), (6), and (7)).
Using credentials (1), (2), (4), (6), and (7) according to rule
(W1) we can infer:
F.students← F.student⊗F.student ∈P
P ≻ F.students← F.student⊗F.student
F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students∈P
P ≻ F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students
F.student ←{Betty} ∈P
P ≻ F.student ← {Betty}
F.student ← {John} ∈P
P ≻ F.student ←{John}
F.phdStudent ←{John} ∈P
P ≻ F.phdStudent ← {John}
Then, using credentials (1), (6) and (4) and rule (W6) we
infer:
P ≻ F.students← F.student⊗F.student
P ≻ F.student ←{John}
P ≻ F.student ← {Betty}
{John}∩{Betty}= φ
P ≻ F.students ←{John,Betty}
In the next step we use the newly inferred credential and
additionally credentials (2) and (7) with the rule (W5):
P ≻ F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students
P ≻ F.phdStudent ←{John}
P ≻ F.students←{John,Betty}
P ≻ F.activeSubject← {John,Betty} ,
showing that the set of entities {John,Betty} is suﬃcient
to activate the subject.
3. Time Validity in RT T
Inference rules with time validity for RT0 were originally
introduced in a slightly diﬀerent way in [8]. In this pa-
per we will try to extend the potential of RT T language
by putting time validity constraints into this language. In
this case credentials are given to entities just for some ﬁxed
period of time. It is quite natural to assume that permis-
sions are given just for ﬁxed period of time, not for ever.
Time dependent credentials take the form: c in v, meaning
”the credential c is available during the time v”. Finite sets
of time dependent credentials are denoted by CP and the
new language is denoted as RT T+ . To make notation clear
we write c to denote ”c in (−∞, +∞)”. Time validity can
be denoted as follows:
[τ1,τ2]; [τ1,τ2);(τ1,τ2];(τ1,τ2);(−∞,τ];(−∞,τ);
[τ,+∞);(τ,+∞);(−∞, +∞);v1∪ v2;v1∩ v2;v1\v2
and v1, v2 of any form in this list, with τ ranging over time
constants.
Example 5 (Time validity for Example1). In our scenario,
it is quite natural to assume that Alex, Betty, David and
John are students only for a ﬁxed period of time. The same
with John and Emily as Ph.D. students. Thus, credentials
(3)–(8) should be generalized to:
F.student ← {Alex} in v1 , (9)
F.student ←{Betty} in v2 , (10)
F.student ← {David} in v3 , (11)
F.student ← {John} in v4 , (12)
F.phdStudent ←{John} in v5 , (13)
F.phdStudent ← {Emily} in v6 , (14)
stating that credentials (3)–(8) are only available during v1,
v2, v3, v4, v5, and during v6, respectively. On the other
hand, credentials (1) and (2) are always valid, as they ex-
press some time-independent facts. Now, by using (1), (2)
and (9)–(14), we want to be able to derive that for exam-
ple the set {Alex,Betty,John} can cooperatively activate
the subject during all of the period: v1 ∩ v2 ∩ v5 or
{Betty,John} during the time v2 ∩ v4 ∩ v5.
3.1. Set-Theoretic Semantics of RT T+
Now we can adapt our set-theoretic semantics of RT T lan-
guage to the new form of credentials. The semantics can
be deﬁned formally in the following way:
Definition 3: The semantics of a set of credentials CP ,
denoted as SCP , is the smallest relation Si, such as:
1. S0 = φ
2. Si+1 =
⋃
(c in v) ∈CP f (Si,c) for i = 0,1, . . .
that is closed with respect to function f , which describes
the meaning of credentials in the same way as in [9].
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3.2. Logic-Programming Semantics of RT T+
When considering the logic-programming semantics
of RT T+ , two possible scenarios must be analyzed: vali-
dation of authority at a given time instant and establishing
authority for a period of time. In the ﬁrst scenario, the
logic-programming semantics is calculated at a precise time
instant, by only considering those time-dependant creden-
tials which are valid at that moment. In view of the fact that
there will be no big changes, we will not provide a precise
deﬁnition of the semantics. The second scenario is more
complex, since it involves computing intersections of va-
lidity periods. Yet this case is as a future work. Feasibility
of creating such semantics is underlined by the fact that
development of an inference system for this case proved to
be possible, as illustrated in the next section.
4. Inference System over RT T+
Credentials
Now, we can adapt inference system over RT T credentials
to take time validity into account. Let CP be a given
set of RT T+ credentials. The application of inference rules
of the inference system will create new credentials, derived
from credentials of the set CP . A derived credential c
valid in time τ will be denoted using a formula C P ≻τ c,
which should be read: credential c can be derived from
a set of credentials C P during the time τ .
Definition 4: The initial set of formulae of an inference
system over a set CP of RT T+ credentials are all in the
form: c in v ∈ C P for each credential c valid in time v
in CP . The inference rules of the system are the following:
c in v ∈ CP τ ∈ v
CP ≻τ c
, (CW1)
C P ≻τ A.r ← B.s C P ≻τ B.s← X
C P ≻τ A.r ← X
, (CW2)
CP ≻τ A.r ← B.s.t C P ≻τ B.s←C
C P ≻τ C.t ← X
CP ≻τ A.r ← X
, (CW3)
CP ≻τ A.r ← B.s∩C.t C P ≻τ B.s← X
CP ≻τ C.t ← X
C P ≻τ A.r ← X
, (CW4)
CP ≻τ A.r ← B.s⊙C.t CP ≻τ B.s← X
C P ≻τ C.t ← Y
CP ≻τ A.r ← X ∪Y
, (CW5)
CP ≻τ A.r ← B.s⊗C.t CP ≻τ B.s← X
CP ≻τ C.t ←Y X ∩Y = φ
CP ≻τ A.r ← X ∪Y
. (CW6)
All the credentials, which can be derived in the sys-
tem, either belong to set CP , rule (CW1) or are of the
type: CP ≻τ A.r ← X , rules (CW2 through CW6). This
new inference system mainly extends the inference rules
from previous section, by replacing rules (Wi) with (CWi)
and considering only valid time-dependent credentials
from CP .
To prove the soundness of the inference system we must
prove that for each new formula CP ≻τ A.r←X , the triple
(A,r,X) belongs to the semantics SCP of the set CP . Let
us ﬁrst note that all the formulae CP ≻τ A.r ← X , such
as A.r ← X ∈ CP are sound. This is proven in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: If A.r ← X ∈ C P then (A,r,X) ∈ SCP .
Proof : The relation SCP , which deﬁnes the semantics
of CP , is a limit of a monotonically increasing sequence
of sets S0,S1 . . . such that S0 = φ . According to Deﬁni-
tion 3: f (S0,A.r ← X) = (A,r,X). Hence, (A,r,X) ∈ S1
and because S1 ⊆ SCP then (A,r,X) ∈ SCP. 
To prove the soundness of the inference system over CP ,
we must prove the soundness of each formula C Pτ ≻
A.r ← X , which can be derived from the set CP . This
is proven in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (soundness): If C P ≻ A.r ← X then (A,r,X)∈
SCP .
Proof : Like the proof of Theorem 1 in [10], but relying
on the above Lemma 1 instead of Lemma 1 from [10]. 
To prove the completeness of the inference system over
a set C P of RT T+ credentials, we must prove that a formula
C P ≻ A.r← X can be derived by using inference rules for
each element (A,r,X)∈ SCP . This is proven in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (completeness): If (A,r,X) ∈ SCP then CP ≻
A.r ← X .
Proof : Like the proof of Theorem 2 in [10], but relying
on the above Lemma 1 instead of Lemma 1 from [10]. 
4.1. Inferring Time Validity of Credentials
This inference system evaluates maximal time validity,
when it is possible to derive the credential c from CP .
It enhances formula CP ≻τ c to CP ≻≻v c, specifying
that at any time τ ∈ v in which CP has a semantics, it
is possible to infer the credential c from CP . To make
notation clear we write ≻≻ to denote ≻≻(−∞,+∞). The in-
ference rules of the system are the following:
c in v ∈ CP
CP ≻≻v c
, (CWP1)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r ← B.s CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
C P ≻≻v1∩v2 A.r ← X
, (CWP2)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r ← B.s.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s←C
C P ≻≻v3 C.t ← X
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r ← X
, (CWP3)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r ← B.s∩C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
C P ≻≻v3 C.t ← X
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r ← X
, (CWP4)
CP ≻≻v1 A.r ← B.s⊙C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
CP ≻≻v3 C.t ← Y
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r ← X ∪Y
, (CWP5)
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CP ≻≻v1 A.r ← B.s⊗C.t CP ≻≻v2 B.s← X
CP ≻≻v3 C.t ←Y X ∩Y = φ
CP ≻≻v1∩v2∩v3 A.r ← X ∪Y
, (CWP6)
C P ≻≻v1 c CP ≻≻v2 c
CP ≻≻v1∪v2 c
. (CWP7)
The key rule is (CWP1). It claims that CP can be used
whenever it is valid. Rules (CW P2) - (CW P6) simply claim
that an inference rule can be used only when all its premises
are true and that the validity of the resulting credentials
is the intersection of validity periods of all the premises.
Finally, the rule (CW P7) claims that if a credential c can be
inferred both with validity v1 and with validity v2, then c
can be inferred with validity v1∪v2. CP ≻≻v generalises
CP ≻τ . They are both equivalent whenever v = [τ,τ].
Because several possible ways may exist to infer a certain
c from CP , all providing a diﬀerent period of validity,
the rule (CWP7) can be used several times to broaden c’s
validity.
Definition 5 (maximal inference): An inference terminating
in CP ≻≻v c is called maximal if and only if:
1) there exists no v′ ⊃ v such that CP ≻≻v′ c, and
2) every sub-inference terminating in CP ≻≻v′′ c
′, for
c′ 6= c, which does not use c in its premises, is max-
imal.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that the rule (CW P7) has been
used as much as possible to infer the validity of c. The
second condition ensures that this property is propagated
through the whole inference tree. Maximal inferences guar-
antee that v in (CWP1) is the maximal time validity for
A.r ← X .
For these inferences we can prove soundness and complete-
ness of C P ≻≻v by means of Theorem 3, which proof
relies on the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: CP ≻τ c implies that there exists a v containing
τ such that CP ≻≻v c.
Proof : It suﬃces to replicate inference for CP ≻τ c, re-
placing every appearance of rule (CWi) with (CWPi), and v
will be the intersection of the validity of all the credentials
CP used in the inference and will be at least [τ,τ]. 
Theorem 3 ([soundness and completeness for maximal in-
ferences): Let CP ≻≻v c be a maximal inference and set
CP of RT T+ credentials be deﬁned. Then CP ≻τ c if and
only if τ ∈ v.
Proof : By induction on the depth of C P ≻≻v c. For the
base case, CP must contain a credential c in v. If τ ∈ v
we can trivialy conclude thanks to (CW1). By induction,
CP ≻τ A.r ← X if and only if τ ∈ v. And vice versa,
assuming by contradiction that there is a τ ′ /∈ v such that
CP ≻τ ′ c; but then the inference leading to CP ≻≻v c
would not be maximal, because Lemma 2 would contradict
the assumption.
For the inductive step, we prove by case analysis on the last
rule used. Analysis of (CWPi) for i = 2...6 is trivial, as it
adapts the reasoning from proof in [10] in the same way as
done above for the base case. The most diﬃcult cases are
when using rule (CWP7). If CP ≻≻v c terminates with
an appearance of (CWP7), then v = v1 ∪ v2. This case is
particular, because formulae CP ≻≻v1 c and CP ≻≻v2 c
are not maximal. Let CP ≻τ c. By Lemma 2, there ex-
ists a v′ containing τ such that CP ≻≻v′ c. Now, it is
that v′ ⊆ v, otherwise CP ≻≻v c would not be maximal.
And vice versa, let τ ∈ v and let CP ≻≻v′ c be the deep-
est sub-inference of CP ≻≻v c, which premises do not
require c (hence, CP ≻≻v′ c has been obtained by us-
ing (CWPi), for i 6= 7) and such that τ ∈ v′. By deﬁnition
of the rules of inference system (inferring time validity),
each of these premises has a time validity containing τi;
since these premises have been obtained by maximal infer-
ences, by induction we can replace ≻≻ . . . with ≻τ . Now,
we have to use (CWi) and conclude. 
Example 6 (Time validity in inference system for Exam-
ple 1). Let us get back to our example and to make
long example shorter, let us use less credentials: (1), (2),
(10), (12), and (13). According to rule (CWP1) we can
infer:
F.students← F.student⊗F.student ∈ CP
CP ≻≻ F.students ← F.student⊗F.student
F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students ∈ C P
CP ≻≻ F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students
F.student ← {Betty} in v2 ∈ CP
CP ≻≻v2 F.student ← {Betty}
F.student ←{John} in v4 ∈ C P
C P ≻≻v4 F.student ←{John}
F.phdStudent ← {John} in v5 ∈ CP
CP ≻≻v5 F.phdStudent ←{John}
When we want to check if two diﬀerent students can coop-
erate, from credentials (1), (10), (12) and rule (CWP6) we
infer:
CP ≻≻ F.students ← F.student⊗F.student
CP ≻≻v2 F.student ← {Betty}
C P ≻≻v4 F.student ←{John}
{Betty}∩{John} = φ
CP ≻≻v2∩v4 F.students←{Betty,John}
In the next step we use it and additionally credentials (2),
(13) and rule (CWP5):
CP ≻≻ F.activeSub ject ← F.phdStudent⊙F.students
CP ≻≻v5 F.phdStudent ←{John}
CP ≻≻v2∩v4 F.students ←{Betty,John}
CP ≻≻v2∩v4∩v5 F.activeSubject←{Betty,John}
showing that the set of entities that can cooperatively acti-
vate a subject is: {Betty,John} during the time: v2∩v4∩v5.
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5. Related Work
Traditional access control systems usually rely on RBAC
model [1], [2], which groups the access rights by the role
name and limits the access to a resource to those users,
who are assigned to a particular role.
The term trust management was ﬁrst applied in the con-
text of distributed access control in [3]. The ﬁrst trust
management system described in the literature was Poli-
cyMaker [11], which deﬁned a special assertion language
capable of expressing policy statements, which were lo-
cally trusted, and credentials, which had to be signed using
a private key. The next generation of trust management
languages were KeyNote [12], which was an enhanced ver-
sion of PolicyMaker, SPKI/SDSI [13] and a few other lan-
guages [14]. All those languages allowed assigning privi-
leges to entities and used credentials to delegate permis-
sions from its issuer to its subject. What was missing
in those languages was the possibility of delegation based
on attributes of the entities and not on their identity.
Trust management, introduced in [3], has evolved since that
time to a much broader context of assessing the reliability
and developing trustworthiness for other systems and in-
dividuals [4]. In this paper, however, we used the term
trust management only in a meaning restricted to the ﬁeld
of access control.
The meaning of roles in RT captures the notion of groups
of users in many systems and has been borrowed from
RBAC approach. The core language of RT family is RT0,
described in detail in [7]. It allows describing localized au-
thorities for roles, role hierarchies, delegation of authority
over roles and role intersections. All the subsequent lan-
guages add new features to RT0. A more detailed overview
of the RT family framework can be found in [5], [6], [15].
Time-dependant credentials were introduced in [8] but just
for RT0 language. Because RT T language is more complex,
powerful and it allows to express security policies more
suited to real needs, we decided to develop extensions to
this speciﬁc language, which has not been done before.
6. Conclusions
This paper deals with modeling of trust management sys-
tems in decentralized and distributed environments. The
modelling framework is the RT T language from a family
of role-based trust management. Three types of semantics
for a set of RT T credentials have been introduced in the
paper. A set-theoretic semantics of RT T has been deﬁned
as a relation over a set of roles and a power set (set of sets)
of entities. All the members of a set of entities related to
a role must cooperate in order to satisfy the role. In the case
of logic-programming semantics, RT credentials are trans-
lated into a logic program. This way, our deﬁnitions cover
the full potential of RT T , which supports the notion of man-
ifold roles and it is able to express structure of threshold
and separation-of-duties policies. Using RT T one can de-
ﬁne credentials stating that an action is allowed if it gets
approved by members of more than one role. This enables
deﬁning complex trust management models in a real envi-
ronment. An operational semantics of RT T is deﬁned as
a inference system, in which credentials can be established
from an initial set of credentials using a simple set of infer-
ence rules. The core part of the paper is a formal deﬁnition
of a sound and complete inference system, in which creden-
tials can be derived from an initial set of credentials using
a set of inference rules. The semantics is given by the set
of resulting credentials of the type A.r ← X , which explic-
itly show a mapping between roles and sets of entities. Us-
ing RT T+ one can deﬁne credentials, which state that an ac-
tion is allowed if it gets approval from members of more
than one role. This improves the possibility of deﬁning
complex trust management models in a real environment.
The goal of this paper is the introduction of time valid-
ity constraints to show how that can make RT T language
more realistic. The properties of soundness and complete-
ness of the inference system with respect to the semantics
of RT T+ are proven. Inference systems presented in this pa-
per are simple, but well-founded theoretically. It turns out
to be fundamental mainly in large-scale distributed sys-
tems, where users have only partial view of their execution
context.
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